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Introduction
Cyberspace—the newest domain of conflict—is among the most prominent
forums of conflict in the twenty-first century. Increasingly nation-states utilize
cyber and information capability in pursuit of foreign policy and national security
objectives. This report focuses on two nation-states that are leading the charge in
this respect: China and Russia.
While Russia seeks to destabilize the global system for its own advantage,
China’s goal is to maintain the current system and replace the United States as
the global hegemon. To that end, China and Russia are pursuing robust cyber
capabilities to advance their respective geopolitical, economic, and security
interests. Moreover, Chinese and Russian state-run enterprises use tools ranging
from cyber espionage to weaponizing information in an effort to undermine the
efficacy of democracy and, in general, western interests around the world.
Figure 1: U.S. Military Approach to Information

1

In this report, we offer an overview of Chinese and Russian cyber capabilities. We
interpret these broadly to include both computer network, or cyber, capabilities
and internet-enabled information and influence capabilities. Their view of the
use of information to influence or “operations in the information environment”
are different from the point of view of the United States, in particular the U.S.
military. Although the U.S. Department of Defense seeks a more unified theory
of how to influence other actors, the reality is that each community involved
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could be called a “cylinder of excellence.” Each group is very good at what they
do, but the efforts are not integrated in the planning or execution stages of the
operations. Figure 1 shows the relationship of the various actors who operate in
the information environment.
By contrast, Russia and China both have a more integrated view of the use of
2
information. Russia’s approach is called “information confrontation” while the
3
Chinese approach is one of “information dominance” Figure 2 illustrates the
Russian integration of all elements of information while Figure 3 shows a
Chinese military theorist’s conceptualization of the information domain.
4

Figure 2: The Russian Perspective on Information Competition

Figure 3: Chinese Military Theorist’s Conception of the Information
5
Domain

newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/russia-china-cyber-offensive-latam-caribbean/

7

This report flows as follows: We start with an overview of Chinese and Russian
cyber capabilities. Contained within each of these sections is an overview of key
state and non-state actors, as well as overviews of known operations and
capabilities. We then provide an analysis of how these capabilities are or could be
used in the future in Latin America and the Caribbean. While the focus of the
analysis is on applications in Latin America and the Caribbean, the information
about Chinese and Russian capabilities is also applicable to operations that they
may undertake in other regions.
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China and Cyberspace
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) maintains a robust capacity to conduct
cyber operations through the combined use of network and psychological
operations, media propagation, and electronic warfare capabilities. China’s
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), views these four forms of operations as
occurring within one collective “information domain,” control over which is
6
critical for future great-power conflicts. The Chinese notion of “information
domain” encompasses cyberspace, but also includes other areas where
information is present. In this section, we focus primarily on Chinese
information capability in cyberspace.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has taken extensive steps to control
7
internal and external information flow both at home and abroad. To this end, the
PRC has undertaken an extensive reorganization of its military and increased its
efforts to expand its influence abroad. Collectively, these policies have been
implemented with the dual purposes of advancing the PRC’s diplomatic and
economic interests on the world stage and bolstering China’s military position in
8
the event of a large-scale conflict.
To fully understand how China conducts cyber operations, one must first
understand the doctrinal basis for the PLA’s approach to cyber warfare. Just as
Russia draws much of its cyber conflict doctrine from the former Soviet Union,
9
China also draws on the legacy of the CCP’s Leninist organizational principles.
Indeed, CCP strategic planners dating back to Mao heavily emphasized the
importance of the control of information and its role in subduing technologically
and materially superior opponents. Hence, China’s use of cyber capabilities
should be viewed as an outgrowth of older doctrines, updated to meet new
strategic and technological realities.
China’s strategy of “informationization” (信息化) has its roots in a series of
reforms made to the PLA in the wake of the Gulf War. Having witnessed the
dismal performance of the Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, PLA
10
military observers concluded that Coalition dominance of the C4ISR sphere
11
was the key factor in their subsequent dismantlement of the Iraqi military. As a
result, PLA observers concluded that control over the information space would
be the decisive factor in future conflicts. Throughout the 1990s China’s
government embarked upon a project of extensive military modernization, with
12
the goal of creating a fully “informationized” fighting force. The importance of
informationization has also been heavily emphasized in Chinese strategic
planning since the early 2000s, through internal PLA publications and strategic
planning documents released by China’s National Defense University (中国人民
解放军国防大学). Most recently, China’s 2015 Defense White Paper outlined the
need to have the capability to fight and win wars under “informationized
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conditions.” Taken collectively, it is clear that China’s leadership regards control
of the information domain—and thus cyberspace—as an operational lynchpin in
future conflicts.
As part of this focus on the importance of information, the PLA differs
significantly from its Western counterparts in its approach to cyber and network
operations. Rather than seeing cyber power as a distinct capability (in the same
vein as air, land, sea, and space), China’s military planners view cyber and
14
network operations as occurring in an “information domain.” This domain
encompasses network, psychological, and media operations, as well as electronic
15
warfare. To achieve control over the information domain, these parts must act
in concert in peacetime and wartime. This view on how the information domain
should be approached is reflected in the way the Chinese state organizes its
military intelligence-gathering organs. Under current PLA doctrine, the ability to
conduct informationized warfare requires extensive knowledge of a potential
adversary’s systems and capabilities. This necessitates constant operational
preparation of the environment (OPE) which blurs the lines between peacetime
16
and wartime operations. Moreover, network operations are not undertaken
with the sole purpose of preparing for military conflict. China also routinely uses
17
network operations to advance other aspects of its national power.
China’s cyber capability is comprised of many military and non-military actors
spanning the public and private sector. Given the CCP’s somewhat byzantine
bureaucratic structure, as well as the considerable overlap of Chinese public and
private entities, it is somewhat difficult to assess how China’s cyber and network
capabilities are organized. However, some clues can be gained from doctrinal
publications released by the PRC. According to the Science of Military Strategy
18
(战略学), Chinese network forces are broken down into three categories:
• Specialized network warfare forces (军队专业网络战力量): These
forces comprise primarily PLA Units that are trained to conduct offensive
and defensive network operations. It is likely that most, if not all, of these
units are assigned a military unit cover designator (MUCD/部队代号).
• Authorized nonmilitary forces (授权力量): These comprise nonuniformed operators, such as the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the
Minister of Public Security (MPS).
• Civilian forces (民间力量): These can include cyber militia/auxiliary
forces, which are embedded within civilian institutions such as
universities and telecommunications companies.
Prior to China’s 2015 military reorganization, it was understood that the PLA
General Staff Department (GSD) Third Department, also referred to as 3PLA,
was tasked with managing and coordinating lines of effort across all three of the
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aforementioned types of forces. This responsibility appears to have passed to
20
the PLA Strategic Support Force following the 2015 military reorganization. The
main actors within these three branches are as follows.

Key Actors: The Military
As indicated earlier, the PLA appears to be the primary coordinating vehicle
through which China conducts operations. Prior to 2015, China’s capabilities
were managed by the General Staff Department (中国人民解放军总参谋部),
which was subordinated to China’s Central Military Commission (中国共产党中
央军事委员会). The General Staff Department, in turn, oversaw the Third
Department of the People's Liberation Army's General Staff Department (3PLA)
and the Fourth Department of the People's Liberation Army's General Staff
Department (4PLA), which supervised signals intelligence gathering and
electronic warfare, respectively. Starting in late 2015, China’s military underwent
a major reorganization, creating the PLA Strategic Support Force (中国人民解放
军战略支援部队). The Strategic Support Force comprises elements of the former
General Staff Department and General Armaments Department. According to
testimony given to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
the Network Systems Department (网络系统部) of the Strategic Support Force
has inherited 3PLA’s mission set, headquarters location, and much of its
21
organizational structure. Consequently, the former 3PLA SIGINT bureaus
appear to be organized primarily according geographical location, with the lion’s
share of departments focused on targets in East Asia, Europe, and the United
States. Their roles and organizational structures are as follows:
• First Bureau: Performs a supporting role to the rest of the department. The
bureau appears to be tasked with maintaining information security within
22
the former 3PLA, as well as handling cryptography.
23

• Second Bureau (Formerly known as Unit 61389): Also known as APT-1, this
unit primarily conducts operations in the United States and Canada. It
appears to collect data on military targets, as well as engaging in industrial
24
espionage activity. The bureau gained notoriety in 2013 after the
cybersecurity firm Mandiant published a profile of its ongoing operations
25
against the United States. Tools that this group uses include WEBC2,
26
BISCUIT, and COOKIEBAG.
• Third Bureau: Appears to primarily collect radio communications from
areas in China’s periphery, including North and South Korea, Taiwan, and
27
Central Asia.
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• Fourth Bureau: Collects signals intelligence on Korean and Japanese
28
targets.
• Fifth Bureau: Collects signals intelligence on Russian targets.

29

• Sixth Bureau: Primarily tasked with surveillance targets in South and
30
Southeast Asia.
• Seventh Bureau: The exact nature of the Seventh Bureau’s mission is
unclear, though it appears to provide a supporting role to the rest of the
former 3PLA. It maintains extensive network attack and defense
31
capabilities, as well as other means for network-centric warfare.
• Eighth Bureau: According to analysis from the Project 2049 Institute, it is
possible that this bureau is focused on targets in Europe, as well as other
parts of the world. Hence, it is possible that this bureau is primarily tasked
32
with targeting Latin America.
• Ninth Bureau: Focuses on absorption and analysis of strategic intelligence.
33

• Tenth Bureau: Appears to be concentrated on surveillance of Russian34
based missile sites.
• Eleventh Bureau aka the 2020 Unit: The exact nature of this bureau’s
mission is unclear, though circumstantial evidence suggests that it focuses
35
on Russian targets.
• Twelfth Bureau aka “Putter Panda”: Targets space-based sensing and
satellite capabilities, as well as tracking information from European
36
aerospace and telecommunications agencies.

Key Actors: Civilian State
Ministry of State Security (MSS)
The Ministry of State Security (中华人民共和国国家安全部), or MSS, is China’s
primary civilian intelligence organization, with a mission that is roughly
37
analogous to that of both the FBI and CIA. The MSS appears to be tasked with
counterintelligence and elimination of dissent within China, as well as collecting
38
on intelligence targets abroad. This entails traditional intelligence gathering
39
missions, as well as industrial espionage activity on the part of the PRC.
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Substantial evidence has emerged indicating that the MSS supports and directs
40
China’s cyber operations, such as APT3, also known as Gothic Panda.
Additionally, the MSS directly oversees the China National Vulnerability
Database (国家信息安全漏洞库), or CNNVD, which catalogues known security
41
vulnerabilities in the Chinese network space. According to the threat
intelligence research firm Recorded Future, the CNNVD routinely withholds or
delays the release of vulnerabilities, with the intention of stockpiling them for
42
exploitation.
Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
The Ministry of Public Security (中华人民共和国公安部) is China’s main internal
security force. The MPS’s responsibilities primarily cover domestic policing,
counterterrorism operations, and domestic information control within the PRC,
as well as managing the People’s Armed Police (中国人民武装警察部队), the
43
main gendarmerie force within China. Consequently, the MPS has a substantial
role in overseeing network governance within China and plays a key part in
maintaining network security. As a result, the MPS has assisted in drafting the
PRC’s cybersecurity Multi-Level Protection Scheme (MLPS), which dictates
44
security protocols for network operators within China. The MPS acts in close
conjunction with the Ministry of Science and Technology (中华人民共和国科学
技术部), which oversees the creation and implementation of tech standards
45
within China. Many of these tech standards are written in a way that
disadvantages foreign firms seeking to operate within China, and are commonly
seen as a vector for technology transfer.

Key Actors: Non-State
Cyber Militias
The PLA has partnered with numerous institutions within China’s civilian sector
to create a number of “cyber militias” that are called upon to perform network
operations. These institutions range from telecommunications companies to
academic institutions and municipal governments within China. The exact
means by which these cyber militias are incorporated into the PLA’s order of
battle is not entirely clear. However, from the limited information that is
available, it seems that they serve as nodes for civil-military integration between
the PLA and China’s civilian economy, as well as being a source of technical
46
expertise that China’s military can draw upon. It does not appear that China’s
cyber militias are currently tasked with conducting offensive CNO or other
sensitive tasks such as industrial espionage.
China’s Internet Service Providers and Telecommunications Firms
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Although they are not assigned a formal intelligence gathering or military role,
China’s telecommunications firms play a key supporting role in bolstering the
PRC’s strategic position within the network domain.
China’s telecommunications firms are not technically part of the PRC
governmental apparatus, nor are they officially classified as State-Owned
Enterprises. However, there are indications that major Chinese
telecommunications firms such as Huawei may act as de facto proxies of the
47
PRC. These firms enjoy extensive financial backing from the Chinese state, and
play a supporting role in advancing China’s strategic interests abroad. For
example, Chinese telecom firms have taken an extremely proactive role in
attempting to influence international standards, such as those governing 5G
48
networks. This drive to sway standards directly impacts China’s efforts to
improve its position within the network domain. The dual nature of standards
writing is aptly summarized by one commentator who noted that authorship of
telecom standards is a “commercial advantage which parlays itself into a security
advantage...Whoever controls the technology knows, intimately, how it was built
49
and where all the doors and buttons are.” Critically, Chinese telecom firms that
50
operate abroad are still subject to PRC law. Hence, these firms would be
required to divulge information that passes through their networks to PRC
military and intelligence authorities.
Another risk is posed by the prospect of Chinese firms acquiring and
compromising elements of foreign supply chains. For example, in 2005 the
51
Chinese firm Lenovo acquired IBM’s PC manufacturing division. Lenovo has
strong ties to institutions such as the China Academy of Sciences (中国科学院),
which in turn has a close working relationship with both the Chinese government
52
and the PLA’s information warfare organs. It has also been implicated in past
53
cyber-espionage activity conducted by the PRC.

Overview of Operations
China’s cyber capabilities render it a tier-1 cyber operator, whose competencies
are comparable to that of Russia and other large nation states. Officially, China
spends $154.3 billion annually on its military, although that number is probably
54
closer to $190 billion when the “unofficial” is factored in. The exact breakdown
of China’s defense budget is classified, and so it is difficult to estimate the total
spent on cyber capabilities. Given that cyber capabilities are identified as one of
four critical domains in China’s 2015 Defense White Paper, it is likely that a
55
considerable amount of money is devoted to developing network capabilities.
Moreover, China is in the process of aggressively expanding its high-tech
manufacturing sector through state-directed initiatives such as the “Made In
China 2025” (中国制造2025) program, as well as long-term planning initiatives,
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including the Medium- And Long- Term Plan for Development of Science and
56
Technology (国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要). It is clear that China seeks
to direct the necessary funds to achieve self-sufficiency in critical sectors such as
information technology, which could lead to the erosion of the U.S.’s advantage
57
in this area. The PRC has also invested considerable sums of money in critical
dual-use technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing,
both of which have a variety of potential military applications, such as machine
58
learning systems and cryptography.
In both peacetime and wartime, China employs its cyber warfare abilities to
enhance its overall strategic position. Critically, these network capabilities are
not employed in a vacuum but work as part of a cross-domain effort to
59
incorporate elements across the DIME spectrum. Put another way, China’s
network capabilities support “cyber-enabled operations” across lines that can be
grouped into several broad categories:
Advancing Diplomatic Claims
China has routinely employed cyber operations as a means of exerting influence
over adversaries and potential partners. For example, its routine penetration of
Taiwanese networks is part of a more extensive effort to exert economic and
60
military pressure on the island to reduce its autonomy. China has also used
network operations to support diplomatic and trade efforts, even in cases where
the PRC does not necessarily have an actively antagonistic relationship with the
target entity. In late 2018, for instance, substantial evidence emerged indicating
that network operators supported by the PRC had targeted the Alaska State
Government in the midst of ongoing trade negotiations between China and the
61
state government. Interestingly, a large number of the network operations
undertaken by the PRC target sub-state actors, many of which are associated
with the so-called “Five Poisons” (五毒): Tibetan separatism, Uigher separatism,
62
Falungong activity, Taiwanese independence, and pro-democracy activism.
There have been numerous documented cases of groups tied to the Chinese
government employing network operations to harass activist groups abroad,
63
especially those tied to minority ethnicities within China. For example, the Red
Alpha and Ghostnet campaigns featured highly sophisticated attacks targeting
64
Tibetan advocacy groups. These phishing and watering hole attacks, along with
software exploits and malware, were designed to work across multiple platforms
65
(e.g. Windows, MacOS, Android, etc.). In the aggregate, the large number of
sophisticated operations against dissident groups suggests that the CCP
considers their suppression to be a high priority, and worth the risk of
international backlash in order to silence groups it perceives as threats to the
PRC’s internal stability.
While China routinely employs cyber operations to support its diplomatic efforts,
these campaigns do not appear to share a uniform modus operandi. Moreover,
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the exact identities of the actors undertaking these operations is difficult to
ascertain, since actors associated with the PRC government take steps to
obfuscate their role. For example, in the case of operations undertaken against
the government of Alaska, the attackers employed an IP address associated with
66
Tsinghua University to conduct their network reconnaissance.
Improving International Perceptions of China
Unlike the Russian Federation, China does not appear to employ large-scale
“troll farms” tasked with shaping the public perception of the PRC abroad.
Instead, China seems to shape its perception abroad using groups like the United
Front, which seeks to shape discourse among foreign policymaking and business
67
spheres. China also routinely utilizes other soft power instruments, such as the
work of Confucius Institute and Chinese-backed think tanks, to mold foreign
68
perception within academia. There have been a few operations undertaken by
Chinese “patriotic hacking” groups. For example, the “Honkers Union/Red
Guest (红客) group targeted U.S. websites in the wake of the 2001 Hainan Island
Incident involving the collision of U.S. and Chinese military aircraft and has
remained semi-active since. However, these incidents almost never escalate
beyond the level of petty site vandalism and do not appear to be closely
69
coordinated by the Chinese government.
Bolstering China’s Military Capabilities
As discussed earlier, the PRC considers “network warfare” to be one of the four
key components of the information domain, which it views as being of
paramount importance in future conflicts. In a wartime situation, it is likely that
China would employ network operations to disrupt the U.S. military’s supply
chain and C4ISR capabilities, thus dramatically reducing its combat
70
effectiveness. Additionally, the PLA augments its capabilities with large
segments of the civilian cyber economy, which could support network operations
71
in the event of a conflict.
Advancing China’s Economic Interests
Perhaps the most consequential component of Chinese cyber activity is their use
of network capabilities to conduct industrial espionage against foreign targets.
These operations have been undertaken by organs of the Chinese military (such
as the former 3PLA Second Bureau), as well as groups such as APT 12/Gothic
Panda, whose affiliations are less clear-cut but are still clearly backed by the PRC
72
government. Network-based industrial espionage is a favored strategy of the
PRC in part because it enables China to intake vast amounts of proprietary
information at comparatively little cost, and also because the difficulty of
73
attribution grants them a veneer of plausible deniability. It has been noted that
many of China’s cyber operators that conduct industrial espionage use relatively
unsophisticated methods with comparatively poor tradecraft practices, perhaps
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74

suggesting a preference for bulk collection over plausible deniability.
Regardless, when left unchallenged, it is clear that PRC-backed cyber operators
have a record of accomplishment, being extremely adept at using network
operations to obtain key intellectual property, thereby enabling China to leapfrog
its technological and economic competitors.
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Russia and Cyberspace
Just as war is the continuation of politics by other means, for Russia, cyber
operations are a continuation of intelligence operations enabled by other means.
For decades, the Russian Federation, and before it the Soviet Union, has been a
keen observer of developing intelligence and military tactics, which they are
prone to adopt and adapt to a relatively contiguous strategy.
In his exposition on Russia’s spetsnaz (Спецназ), or Special Forces,
retired Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) officer Vladimir Kvachkov observed,
“A new type of war has emerged, in which armed warfare has given up its
decisive place in the achievement of military and political objectives of war to
76
another kind of warfare — information warfare.” Kvachkov elucidates two types
of information warfare: (1) information-psychological warfare, which is
“conducted in conditions of natural rivalry, i.e. always,” and (2) information
technology warfare, which targets IT systems and is conducted “during wars and
armed conflict.” This first definition of information warfare largely comports
with Western conceptualizations of the same term. The second is what the West
often refers to as either cyber or computer network warfare. In recent years, the
Kremlin has begun to leverage both methods and has spawned a third, hybrid
method between the two in the form cyber-enabled information operations. In
Russian parlance, these psychological information operations are referred to as
active measures.
Former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin has described active measures
(активные мероприятия) as actions taken by the thenSoviet Union to discredit geopolitical adversaries and “conquer world public
77
opinion.” Active measures are a key tenet in what is often referred to as “hybrid
warfare” in the West, where non-military measures are used in concert with
military measures to achieve a strategic objective. However, according to Russian
doctrine they are used during times of peace and war.
In testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in March 2017,
King’s College London War Studies professor Thomas Rid described the
historical evolution of Russian active measures well, saying they seek to exploit
78
existing cracks in adversaries. He further identified three trends necessary to
understand today’s circumstances. First, for the last 60 years, active measures
have become the norm. Second, for the last 20 years, aggressive Russian digital
espionage campaigns (i.e. hacking key targets to gather intelligence) have
become commonplace. Third, in the last two years, we have seen the Kremlin
merge these two trends in the form of cyber-enabled active measures, or—put
simply—hacking and leaking.
Before exploring how strategy has evolved and manifested in the real world in
recent years, it is important to note that, like cyber operations, active measures
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are not an end, but rather a means. Since the Soviet Era, the Kremlin has
employed active measures in an attempt to achieve what the West calls “reflexive
control” over adversaries, or the ability to alter an adversary’s perception of the
world. Russian pursuit of reflexive control is the product of decades of
psychological and mathematical research at Russian military universities on how
best to manage and influence an opponent’s perception of the world. Crucially,
distorting an adversary’s conception of reality not only influences that
adversary’s decision-making calculus, but also makes it more predictable.
The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces is led by General Valery
Gerasimov. Like many Russian military strategists before him, Gerasimov is a
keen observer of military and strategic trends in and out of combat. In 2014, he
authored a short paper entitled “The Value of Science in Prediction,” in which he
examines—in great detail—Western military strategy and outlines the current
79
and future operational environment from his perspective. While the document
should not be considered ironclad doctrine as some have dubbed it, it does,
nonetheless, provide insight into the most powerful military minds in the
Kremlin. Gerasimov notes that “the use of political, diplomatic, economic and
other non-military measures in combination with the use of military forces” will
80
normalize globally as a part of new, non-linear warfare. In short, Russia views
the world as locked in ongoing and perpetual conflict between powers where the
lines between war and peace are blurry at best and nonexistent at worst.
As Charles Bartles observes, “One of the most interesting aspects of Gerasimov’s
article is his view of the relationship on the use of nonmilitary and military
measures in war. The leveraging of all means of national power to achieve the
state’s ends is nothing new for Russia, but now the Russian military is seeing war
81
as being something much more than military conflict.” For Gerasimov, warfare
has become decreasingly linear, and the previously well-defined space between
wartime and peacetime has been blurred. To Gerasimov, “wars are no longer
82
declared and, when they begin, unfold according to an unusual pattern.”
Notably, Gerasimov’s long-term view appears to have been molded by
observations of U.S. military strategy and action, particularly operations rightly
and wrongly attributed to the U.S. in the Balkans in the 1990s and more recent
actions in Libya.
Against that broader doctrinal backdrop, it’s important to draw back the curtain
and provide insights on how the government of the Russian Federation leverages
information and cyber capabilities as influential tools of state power in the digital
age. From here, we will describe the major Russian threat actors, their
capabilities and past operations, our analysis of where these teams may apply
their capabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the broader
implications for the United States and its partners in the region.
A complex web of actors from intelligence agencies and the military to industry,
criminal organizations, and the media underpins Russian cyber, information, and
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influence capacity. The pieces of this network have different―yet often
overlapping and competing―roles, responsibilities, and influence in
implementing cyber-enabled active measures against domestic and foreign
adversaries.

Key Actors: The Russian Intelligence Community
The Russian foreign intelligence apparatus consists of the following three
primary organizations. These agencies possess overlapping or unclear
responsibilities or remits and compete with one another for political influence
83
and funding.
• The Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)
• The Federal Security Service (FSB)
• The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
The Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)
The Main Intelligence Directorate (Главное
Разведывательное Управление or GRU in
Russian) is the sole intelligence agency surviving from the Soviet era. As the longstanding military intelligence agency, the GRU is primarily tasked with gathering
military intelligence and conducting active measures, but plays a subsidiary role
84
in political intelligence, economic intelligence, and counterintelligence.
In the context of offensive cyber operations and cyber-enabled operations, the
GRU is staffed with both network operators and information operators. Referred
to variously as Sofacy, APT 28, and Fancy Bear in cybersecurity circles, the GRU’s
network operators exhibit characteristics very similar to the National Security
Agency in the United States: a very formal code environment with complex
85
research into cyber vulnerabilities, exploits, and code development. The GRU
contains Unit 26165, the group accused of compromising the U.S. DCCC and
86
Hillary Clinton presidential campaign.
The GRU’s information operations team works closely with its network operators
to disseminate stolen and sometimes fake information to the press and public.
This group, which is separate from those gathering information, consists of
regional experts to craft messaging and operational security specialists to
obfuscate the source of messaging. Unit 74455, the unit accused of primarily
orchestrating the dissemination of DCCC and Hillary Clinton campaign
communications via Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, and other personas, also sits within
the GRU.
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In general, GRU teams target political opposition (domestically and
internationally) and the fruits of their hacking activity often support in-house
information operations. Cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike has assessed with a
medium level of confidence that the team known as Fancy Bear or APT28 is the
GRU.
The Federal Security Service (FSB)
The Federal Security Service (Федеральная Служба
Безопасности or FSB in Russian) is the main successor to the
Soviet-era KGB and is a jack-of-all-intelligence-trades, though its primary remit
87
is in counterintelligence and political security. Like the GRU, network and
information operators sit within the agency, likely in the Second Division of FSB
88
Center 18, also known as the FSB Center for Information Security.
The agency’s network operators typically utilize a hacking toolkit with add-ons to
89
customize the tool to a given mission. This suggests at least some internal code
development and research expertise. The activity of the FSB’s information
operators appears to display slightly different traits from that of their military
counterparts. Where the GRU typically co-opts well-known brands on social
media and works through traditional media, the FSB takes a noisier approach,
creating and using a large number of fake social media accounts to spread
information and leverages non-state actors, like the Internet Research Agency, to
90
magnify messaging.
The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
The Foreign Intelligence Service (Служба Внешней
Разведки or SVR in Russian) is Russia’s external intelligence agency.
Despite its title and status as the primary foreign intelligence service, little
evidence exists that the SVR is involved in cyber or cyber-enabled operations.
Instead, the SVR focuses on the cultivation and maintenance of human
intelligence networks.
Uncertain Teams—Energetic Bear, Palmetto Fusion, Sandworm Team
In addition to the known activities of the FSB and GRU, three teams—one no
longer operating and two conducting active campaigns—have yet to be attributed
to one of the two agencies, though it is assessed with a high level of confidence
that the teams are Russian state actors. These teams are:
• Energetic Bear: Operating from the late 2000s until 2014, Energetic
Bear conducted economic espionage on the oil and natural gas industry.
In 2014, the group began gathering information on SCADA and industrial
control system vulnerabilities and was exposed by threat researchers. It
91
promptly ceased operations.
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• Palmetto Fusion: Operating from 2015 to present, the group consistently
compromises or attempts to compromise critical infrastructure, focused
primarily on energy utilities. Some threat researchers assess with low
confidence that Palmetto Fusion is the same group of individuals as
92
Energetic Bear, operating with new tools and techniques
• Sandworm Team: Operating from 2015 to present, the Sandworm Team
93
has repeatedly sabotaged the Ukrainian power grid. The NotPetya
ransomware displayed operational traits led to the belief by some that the
94
Sandworm Team developed and released the worm. Because NotPetya
has been attributed by multiple intelligence agencies to the GRU, if the
Sandworm Team developed and deployed NotPetya, it team likely resides
95
within the GRU. It is also likely that Sandworm operators perpetrated the
2018 attacks on the International Olympic Committee at the start of the
Winter Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea, and other global sports
governing bodies.

Key Actors: Private and Criminal Groups
In 2017, in response to a question about Russian meddling in U.S. elections,
Russian President Vladimir Putin denied state involvement but acquiesced that
some “patriotic hackers” may have attempted to influence the American
election. President Putin’s assertion that the Russian state played no role is
deemed false with high confidence. However, it is nonetheless important to
recognize the non-state groups that support the activity of the intelligence
agencies. These “Patriotic Hackers” private, non-criminal groups include:
• Concord Consulting: Concord Consulting and Catering is an
organization run by Yevgeny Prigozhin, one of President Putin’s closest
confidants. Prigozhin and Concord Consulting provided the financial
backing to the Internet Research Agency. Prigozhin also likely funds
Wagner Group, the private military firm active in Syria.
• Internet Research Agency: This agency is the so-called “Russian Troll
Farm” that targeted and scaled messaging to key constituents in swing
states during the 2016 U.S. election.
• Digital Security: Accused of providing technical support to the FSB.
• Kvant Scientific Research Institute: Accused of providing technical
support to the FSB.
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• Kaspersky Labs: The relationship between the anti-virus and threat
intelligence company and Russian security services is unclear.
In addition, the Russian cybercrime network sometimes works in support of
Kremlin objectives. The exact level of coordination and direction exercised over
these patriotic hackers is unclear from open-source research. However, activities
likely fall somewhere on the spectrum between state-integrated and state96
ignored:
• State-integrated: The national government conducts the attack using
integrated non-state and state resources.
• State-ordered: The national government directs the attack.
• State-coordinated: The national government coordinates attacks by
suggesting operational details.
• State-shaped: The state provides some support, but third parties shape
and control the operations.
• State-encouraged: The state encourages activity as a matter of policy,
but third parties shape, conduct, and control the operations.
• State-ignored: The state knows about the activity but is unwilling to
prevent it.
A shift in the tenor of Russian non-state cyber activity can be observed around
the time the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine.
According to at least one observer, the pre-annexation attitude was one of stateignorance. Around and following the culmination of the Sochi Olympics and the
annexation of Crimea, the activities of the oligarch-led patriotic hackers followed
a model of state shaping, coordination, or even integration much more closely.

Overview of Operations
Trends in Russian cyber activity over the past three years suggest that the
Kremlin is, and has been, investing significantly in developing strategy, tactics,
and tools to leverage cyber capability. A study conducted by Russian data
security company Zecurion Analytics posits that the Kremlin controls а “top 5”
cyber army. According to reports on the Zecurion study, the Kremlin dedicates
approximately $300 million per year to offensive cyber forces and employs some
97
1,000 on-keyboard personnel. However, beyond Russian-authored reports that
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may or may not be Kremlin propaganda, experts have observed a steady increase
in both the number and sophistication of Russian-originated cyber activity,
suggesting that the Kremlin is investing in this space.
Russian state or state co-opted cyber capability generally follows a number of
trends. First, a disproportionate number of attacks exploit vulnerabilities in
Adobe Flash, Java, and Internet Explorer. Second, campaigns typically reuse
vulnerabilities multiple times, relying on the poor patching practices of their
targets. Third, while the tools vary depending on the agency in question, some
tactics are generally consistent. For example, the process for compromising
targets is often:
1. Sending a spearphishing email with a malicious attachment or with a
spoofed URL (often using bit.ly or other link-shortening tools);
2. Getting the user to download an attachment or visit a compromised URL
to install tailored exploit;
3. Using newly created access to install a dropper with malware, usually an
implant with a Remote Access Tool (RAT);
4. Creating a link with attacker command and control computer
infrastructure using RAT.
Finally, if the objective of the campaign is informational, Russian intelligence
services have become adept at integrating their network operators with their
information operators. What this means is that the knowledge gained via
offensive computer network operations is seamlessly integrated into ongoing or
new information operations.
While these process and trends generally hold true for Russian state and criminal
actors, different teams display unique strengths and abilities as dictated by their
mission sets, budgets, and human technical capacity. Figure 4 outlines the cyber
and information capabilities of the most prominent actors introduced above.
Figure 4: Russian Actors and the Capabilities
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Actor

Operational
Characteristics

Notable Tools

Cyber Capability
- Modular:
developed a suite
of tools that they
are able to tailor to
targets and “plug
and play”

- 97% of work
completed during
the working week
The GRU (APT
28 or
FancyBear)

- 88% of work done
between 8 a.m. and
6 p.m. local
(Moscow) time
- Build malware in
Russian-language
settings

- Formal
environment and
custom code
- Backdoor/
Exploit: Xagent
- Backdoor/
Exploit/ Dropper:
Sofacy
- Credential
Harvester: Sasfis

- Highly
obfuscated
- Leverages opensource repositories
to accelerate
development and
provide deniability
- Once inside
target network or
device, completes
multiple lateral
movements via
manual and
“legitimate” means

Informational
Capability

- Regional
specialists
- Not co-located
with network
operators, who are
in a separate
building about 5km
away, but there is
close coordination
between teams
- Quality over
quantity: a tailored
approach to
information
dissemination,
using false
identities
(DCLeaks, Guccifer
2.0) and WordPress
blogs to leak
information and
propagate
narratives.

- Targeted
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Actor

Operational
Characteristics

Notable Tools

- Lots of hacking
activity rather than
meticulously
targeted activity

Cyber Capability

- Modular
- High obfuscation

The FSB (APT
29 or
CozyBear)

- Many jobs,
suggesting a good
deal of behind-thescenes coordination
- Highly adaptable
(able to counter
defensive
measures)

Informational
Capability

- Twitter Backdoor:
HAMMERTOSS

- Scattershot: lots
of hacking of many
different accounts

-Quantity over
quality: use of bots
and fake accounts
to disseminate
information

- Use of opensource repositories
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Actor

Operational
Characteristics

Notable Tools

Cyber Capability

Informational
Capability

- Highly
sophisticated:
obfuscated,
targeted, modular,
and manipulable

Grid Teams
(Sandworm
Team &
Palmetto
Fusion)

- Energy Grid
Malware: Crash
Override/
Industryoer
-

- Energy Grid
Malware: Black
Energy 3.0
- Ransomware:
NotPetya (alleged)

- Generally targets
industrial sectors
and industrial
control systems
- May use DDoS or
Ransomware
attacks to obscure
or distract from
grid attacks

-

- Creates
persistent grid
access (have
access to grid
infrastructure in
the U.S. and
elsewhere), but
rarely delivers
payload to
manipulate
systems (Ukraine)
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Actor

Operational
Characteristics

Notable Tools

Cyber Capability

Informational
Capability
- The so-called
“Troll Factory”
- Nongovernmental
organization,
funded by Yevgeny
Prigozhin (aka
“Putin’s Chef”) and
his Concord
Consulting firm
- Magnifies and
amplifies key
information to
support Kremlin
narratives at home
and abroad

The Internet
Research
Agency

-

-

-

- Uses a
combination of
fake social media
accounts run by
humans and bots;
also creates and
administers fake
“groups” on social
media websites to
organize in-person
protests and rallies
- Hundreds of
employees
- Well financed
(monthly budget of
over USD$1.2
million for a single
project)
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Globally, Russia has leveraged cyber capability in three primary ways: (1)
operational preparation of the environment (OPE), (2) cyber warfare, and (3)
cyber-enabled influence operations. Here, we describe individual operations of
each of these types, in order to help build understanding of how a Russian
adversary might leverage cyberspace for strategic gain in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE)
Like most tier-1 cyber powers, Russia engages in robust operational preparation
of the environment (OPE), largely as a “just in case” exercise, not necessarily as a
sign of impending military operations. Russian cyber operators, most likely from
Sandworm team and Palmetto Fusion (likely both within the GRU), consistently
develop access to key communications systems (military and civil) and critical
infrastructure in adversaries they anticipate could one day engage in active
hostilities. Because the high degree of research, time, and effort needed to create
and maintain access in adversary critical infrastructure systems, Russia seeks to
maintain access points should they wish to conduct cyber warfare (as described
below) in the future.
In most cases, these accesses are largely benign and have not been used to create
any disruption during peacetime. This type of operation is what has led to recent
reporting in the United States regarding Russian cyber activity targeting energy
98
and other critical infrastructure sectors. It is also possibly the activity that led to
99
an accidental blast furnace explosion in Germany. However, access can go from
benign to malicious rapidly, and most of the Russian cyber actors outlined above
possess the tools and capability to rapidly escalate its actions to cyber warfare.
Cyber Warfare
The clearest case of intentional cyber warfare conducted by Russian services is
currently taking place in Ukraine during ongoing kinetic hostilities. In Ukraine,
Russian cyber warfare has taken two shapes: information operations and critical
infrastructure attacks.
By targeting mobile networks, Wi-Fi, mobile phones, and other military and
civilian communications networks, Russian actors are able to conduct extensive
in-theatre information operations. In Ukraine, these activities have included:
• Psychological and friction operations against troops on the front lines—
and their families—via direct text messages to individuals including things
like:
◦ “Your battalion commander has retreated. Take care of yourself.”
◦ “You are encircled. Surrender. This is your last chance.”
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◦ “Ukrainian soldier, what are you doing here? Your family needs you
alive.”
◦ “You will not regain Donbas back. Further bloodshed is pointless.”
◦ “Ukrainian soldier, it’s better to retreat alive than stay here and
100
die.”
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against government and
non-government communication systems
In addition to compromising communications systems, Russian actors have
demonstrated a proclivity for targeting critical national infrastructure systems for
compromise and manipulation. This type of operation relies on the robust OPE
described above. The most notable case in the Ukraine occurred during the 2015
and 2016 BlackEnergy attacks on its power grid, which shut power off to more
than 200,000 Ukrainians during the cold winter months.
Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations
This final brand of operation, a cyber-enabled influence operation, is perhaps the
most widely recognized Russian intelligence operation. While the welldocumented activity around the 2016 U.S. presidential election elevated the
profile of this tactic to the global political level, Russian intelligence services have
engaged in similar information operations for the better part of a century,
particularly in Eastern Europe.
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Chinese and Russian Use of Cyber Capabilities in
Latin America and the Caribbean
The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China operate in
cyberspace in pursuit of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
(DIME) interests around the globe. Although many in Latin America and
Caribbean view cyber competition as an issue for Russia, China, the European
Union, and the United States, they are discovering that, to paraphrase Leon
Trotsky, “You may not be interested in cyber, but cyber is interested in you.”
Based on U.S. performance in conflicts since 1990, Russia and China have both
determined that armed conflict with the United States is a bad idea. Based on
that same analysis, however, both have discovered that the way to confront the
United States is through asymmetric means below the threshold of “armed
attack” or “use of force” as mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations.
Crossing that threshold allows the aggrieved state to use all means necessary to
defend themselves (as with 9/11) or allows the United Nations to call for armed
action under Chapter VII (as with Desert Storm). As such, both China and Russia
have developed methods of operating in the “grey zone,” or below the threshold
that triggers a military response.
Russia and China have discovered the utility of these grey zone operations and
pursue them globally. The techniques that were developed to confront the United
States are now being deployed elsewhere, such as Taiwan and Ukraine. These
techniques are demonstrated across the four elements of national power:
diplomacy, information, military, and economy.
China seeks to play the long game and ensure that its interests are secured,
including the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) as well as access to natural resources
and commodities. It seeks to improve its global perceptions and influence on
issues like the South China Sea and Taiwan. Although Beijing does not seek
military supremacy, it does want to bolster its military capabilities. Its economic
interests, however, are its priority; increasing economic status will ensure a
quiescent Chinese population and enable the other instruments of national
power, like diplomacy, information, and military power.
Since the Moscow Security Conference in 2007, Russia has sought to contest the
current global system that it believes is designed to give the advantage to the
United States and partners to Russia’s detriment. Moscow’s strategic goal is
regime survival and the morphing of the current system to a multipolar global
system, but it will not challenge the system overtly, instead seeking opportunities
to destabilize it. The intent is to fracture intergovernmental organizations, like
NATO and the European Union, while undermining international institutions,
like humanitarian law and norms. Through political warfare, they hope to contest
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Western democracies, diminishing their power while bolstering Russian power,
and regain a buffer zone in Eastern Europe. Although Latin America and the
Caribbean are not strategic priorities for Russia, they will challenge the United
States in its near abroad to reduce U.S. influence in the region.
Russian and Chinese options for leveraging cyber capabilities in Latin America
and the Caribbean may be examined through the lens of the instruments of
national power. As an example, the Chinese use diplomacy along with
information and intelligence operations in support of its economic goals. These
elements are interrelated and all are performed simultaneously in support of
strategic goals. Figure 6 provides an overview of our DIME Framework as well as
some examples of Chinese and Russian objectives falling under each category.
Figure 6: The DIME Framework and Cyber Operations

Instrument

Description

Examples of Chinese
Objectives

Examples of Russian
Objectives

Operative
Question

- Diminish
international
opposition to Russian
military actions in
Ukraine and Syria

Diplomatic

Efforts by a state
to influence the
policy or action
of another state
through
negotiation.

- Grow global support for
its territorial claims in the
South China Sea.
- Decrease the number of
states that recognize the
legitimacy of the
Republic of China
(Taiwan).

- Cast doubt on the
legitimacy and
primacy of
multilateral forums
- Cultivate partners in
the region to
enhance support for
its legal and
normative initiatives
to bolster state
sovereignty and
provide international
top-cover for
authoritarianism.
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Instrument

Description

Information

Efforts by a state
to influence the
policy or action
of another state
or population by
controlling or
spreading
information,
targeted at the
local population.

Military

Economic

Efforts by a state
to influence the
policy or action
of another state
or group via the
use of military
power.
Efforts by a state
to utilize
economic power
to influence
another state or
group, and to
bolster its own
economic
strength and
reach.

Examples of Chinese
Objectives

- Increase positive
sentiment towards China
in the region, likely in
support of economic and
market-share goals

- Build military to military
partnerships

Examples of Russian
Objectives
- Sow discord and
undermine
democratic
processes through
misinformation
- Enable populist
politicians, which
tend towards more
favorable views of
Russia.
-Support friendly
militaries

- Collect military
intelligence

- Develop and
maintain access to
critical and critical
information
infrastructure.

- Guarantee access to key
resources

- Bolster the local
market for Russian
arms and energy
exports

- Bolster the local market
for Chinese high-tech,
telecommunications, and
arms exports.

- Maintain access to
local black and
criminal markets for
Russian actors.

Operative
Question

What cyber and
information
operations could
Russia or China
conduct in the
region in support
of information
objectives?

What cyber and
information
operations could
Russia or China
conduct in the
region in support
of military
objectives?
What cyber and
information
operations could
Russia or China
conduct in the
region in support
in support of
economic
objectives?

Here, we examine how China and Russia may use cyber and information
operations in support of objectives in each of these areas.
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China in Latin America and the Caribbean
In this section, we explore how China could use cyber and information
operations in Latin America and the Caribbean in support of diplomatic,
information, military, and economic objectives. The DIME objectives described
herein are grounded in doctrine and analysis of the geopolitical goals of China.
However, due to limited open-source material, the analysis of how China might
apply cyber and information capabilities in the region to support these goals is
largely based on extrapolation based on Chinese activity elsewhere and Latin
American and Caribbean vulnerabilities.
Diplomatic Objectives
China performs cyber and information operations in order to build support from
decision-makers and the general population for Chinese diplomatic priorities in
much of the world. Current Chinese diplomatic priorities include building
support for its initiatives as part of the One-China policy against the recognition
of the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan), its territorial claims in the
South China Sea, and its approach to multilateral forums like the UN. In addition,
China increasingly provides support to those who oppose U.S. interests, where
they do not align with Chinese interests, in an effort to frustrate the United States
101
politically.
The Taiwan issue is of potentially heightened importance in Latin America and
the Caribbean, as nine of the 11 states that recognize Taiwan are located in the
hemisphere: Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Saint
102
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Primary
drivers of these states’ loyalty to Taiwan are financial gifts and investments from
103
Taiwanese companies. Nonetheless, this support is challengeable, as shown by
104
Panama switching sides in June 2017, the Dominican Republic changing
105
allegiances in April 2018, and El Salvador recognizing the PRC in August of
106
2018. Reporting suggests that China will likely accelerate its efforts to continue
107
diplomatically to isolate Taiwan. This push involves seizing control of online
108
narratives regarding Taiwan’s independence. It could also include conducting
cyber operations to determine the stance of key decision-makers vis-à-vis
Beijing’s interests as well as reach people either who sympathize with them or
who are vulnerable to its influence and can be subordinated to their goals.
More generally, China will continue its somewhat unique approach to
multilateralism, which is characterized by increasing engagement in existing
multilateral forums, pushing hard on issues it deems in its interest and blocking
those that are not, avoiding responsibility for particularly burdensome initiatives,
109
and generally refraining from making grand proposals at multilateral forums.
Relevant to cyber and information operations, China has been a proponent of
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cybersecurity conventions that would transfer greater responsibility over the
internet to the hands of sovereign states and enabling greater state control of
content and information online, as signaled by their repeated sponsorship of a
letter to the UN General Assembly proposing discussions on the topic and co110
signing a recent proposed resolution. China may covertly engage in cyber and
information activity that undermines existing international norms for the dual
purpose of achieving other objectives and bolstering the case for new
conventions.
Information Objectives
The Chinese government engages in public messaging campaigns in support of
economic and political objectives. For example, in key markets, consumers
campaigns to encourage consumers to buy Chinese products (advertising) or
build popular support for Chinese diplomatic objectives (propaganda). Some of
these campaigns are transparent, others less so.
Military Objectives
China actively works to build military-to-military partnerships with several
militaries in the region. As part of this effort, China has, for example, built
schools for military training professional military education in China similar to
the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation in the United States.
111
They invite participants from a variety of countries in the hemisphere to attend
those schools. Militaries sending troops to train in these facilities should be
cautious about bringing electronics and other communications systems with
them, which may be vulnerable to exploitation during such visits providing novel
collection platforms.
In addition, China provides low-tech supplies such as boots and uniforms to
regional militaries through state and quasi-state enterprises. These activities are
all part of a long-term Chinese strategy to become the partner of choice of
militaries in the region, though it is unclear how, apart from traditional
advertising and propaganda, cyber and information operations would be used in
support of these objectives.
However, it is reasonable to expect that the Chinese military services currently
and will continue to use cyber means to conduct intelligence operations against
influential regional military powers, like Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico.
Furthermore, like most tier-1 cyber powers, Chinese military entities are likely to
conduct cyber operations to generate access to key communications systems,
though no evidence of such activities exist in open source material. Likely targets
for such access operations include command and control (C2) infrastructure of
potential military adversaries and government communication systems. These
operations may come in the form of traditional computer network operations, but
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may also take the shape of strategic supply chain compromises on high tech and
telecommunications exports.
Economic Objectives
Economic goals are likely to continue to be a top priority for China in the Western
Hemisphere and much of their cyber and information activity will be designed to
pursue these interests. To that end, China seeks to guarantee access to resources
and to open up new markets, while diminishing the economic might of
competitors. Some commentators suggest the goal of this activity is to become
the world’s predominant economic hegemon. Specifically, Chinese companies,
often with governmental assistance, continue to work open new markets to
112
Chinese high tech, telecommunications, and arms exports. In addition, China
seeks to retain access to critical resources such as Venezuelan oil and a Chinesedominated Nicaraguan canal.
Companies typically attempt to obtain favorable contracts and take-overs of local
companies to guarantee resources and achieve monopolies in states to ensure not
only access to resources, but to coerce the target state if necessary. In the past,
Chinese government entities have been accused of conducting cyber operations
in support of those goals, namely though intelligence operations to determine
opportunities; influence operations to decrease local resistance to Chinese
economic interests; and intellectual property theft to help Chinese firms emulate
113
locally successful products and services.
In spite of bilateral agreements with the likes of Australia, Germany, and the
United States, aimed at blunting Chinese cyber industrial espionage, evidence
from each country suggests that Chinese firms and state organizations have
114
continued this activity. It is highly likely that Chinese entities will engage in
similar activity in markets of interest.
Although the theft of intellectual property is the most often cited form of Chinese
industrial espionage, the Chinese also undertake intelligence operations to
obtain local market advantages. For example, a common Chinese tactic for
bolstering economic reach involves the acquisition of local companies in foreign
markets. In the past, Chinese state security services have assisted corporate
takeovers by providing intelligence on the internal deliberations and potential
115
vulnerabilities of local companies targeted for mergers or acquisitions. Some of
this intelligence is gathered through open-source and human collection methods;
some intelligence is collected via illicit breaches of company and government
computer systems. As China becomes more interested and assertive in Latin
American and Caribbean markets, they can be expected to replicate many of the
cyber and information operations and tactics they have employed elsewhere.
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Russia in Latin America and the Caribbean
In this section, we explore how Russia could use cyber and information
operations in Latin America and the Caribbean in support of diplomatic,
information, military, and economic objectives. As with our China in Latin
America and the Caribbean section, the DIME objectives described herein are
grounded in doctrine and analysis of the geopolitical goals of Russia. However, as
with China, due to limited open-source material the analysis of how Russia might
apply cyber and information capabilities in the region to support these goals is
largely based on extrapolation based on Russian activity elsewhere and Latin
American and Caribbean vulnerabilities.
Media in the region have been quick to point to Russian meddling in elections in
116
Latin America and the Caribbean. In open source material, there exists limited
evidence of past or ongoing cyber-enabled influence operations in the region
akin to those around the 2016 presidential election in the United States. Where
social media bots and fake accounts have spread political messaging around key
elections and votes in the region, this activity had largely been attributed to
domestic actors deploying similar tactics to those used by Russian intelligence
117
services in the lead up to the U.S. election. However, recent events in
118
Venezuela point to increased Russian activity.
Notably, however, major media platforms—RT and Sputnik—have developed a
stronger presence in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years and have
119
increased their Spanish and Portuguese language coverage. In addition, while
Russia has a history of using cyber and information capabilities in the event of
hot conflicts, there is no public evidence of Russian actors penetrating civil
communication systems or critical infrastructure for exploitation in the region.
Nonetheless, in October 2018, Symantec reported that GRU operators targeted a
government in Latin America. No more information was provided, including
which government and the type of system targeted. However, this is the first
120
open-source claim that Russia is targeting Latin American or Caribbean assets.
Diplomatic Objectives
Russia’s global diplomatic priorities include diminishing international opposition
to Russian military actions in Ukraine and Syria, casting doubt on the legitimacy
and primacy of multilateral forums that have been dominated by the United
States and Europe and traditionally underpinned liberal democratic order, and
spreading support for its legal and normative initiatives to bolster state
sovereignty and provide international top-cover for authoritarianism
domestically. Russia’s regional diplomatic priorities are to bolster partnerships in
the region and weaken U.S. influence, while possibly cultivating support for
initiatives and proposals at multilateral forums like the UN General Assembly. In
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addition, no Latin American or Caribbean countries have joined the U.S.-led
sanctions on Russian individuals. The Kremlin would most likely prefer to keep it
that way.
Much of Latin America and the Caribbean are part of the Cold War-era NonAligned Movement. Today, this means that they are potentially swing states on
international policy issues. In recent years, Russia has made a concerted push at
the United Nations in favor of an international convention on information
security. While seemingly innocuous on the surface, the proposal represents an
attempt to diplomatically legitimize authoritarian approaches to controlling
information and the internet. As New America has noted, Latin American and
Caribbean countries are likely to be crucial “digital deciders” in that particular
121
diplomatic debate.
Russia, like any well-resourced country, assists their diplomatic efforts with
intelligence, and increasingly cyber-enabled intelligence. It is reasonable,
therefore, to expect decision makers in countries deemed of diplomatic interest
to be under surveillance. In addition, Russia may continue to conduct cyber
operations that undermine international law in an effort to create more urgency
122
and purchase for a binding international agreement.
Information Objectives
Outside of its near abroad, the Russian government has shown a proclivity
towards leveraging information to exert influence and sow discord over other
instruments of national power like diplomacy, the military, and trade or
investment. As we note above, the Russian government views information
campaigns as a relatively cheap and scalable means to attain its national goals.
Russia’s information objectives globally include undermining democratic
processes, in part to seek greater legitimacy for its own authoritarian approach to
governing, and enabling populist politicians in democratic parts of the world,
many of whom have exhibited more favorable views of Russia in recent years.
Russia is likely to operate in the information environment throughout the
hemisphere as part of its strategy to provide low-cost irritation to the United
123
124
States. They are and will continue to conduct white and grey propaganda
through their traditional media outlets such as Actualidad RT or RT (the former
Russia Today) in Spanish. This propaganda will support Moscow’s global
interests such as gathering support for Russian activities in Ukraine and Syria and
diminish international support for U.S. interests. Although it is not clear from
open-source information whether Russian actors have engaged in more covert
information operations in the region, the cost of doing so in the region would be
125
low. They could, therefore, periodically participate in black propaganda
operations such as the campaign in Central America to persuade the population
that Americans were adopting children to take them back to the United States to
126
be used for body parts.
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Military Objectives
Russia has two priorities for military activities in the Western Hemisphere. The
first is to support friendly regimes. The second is to develop and maintain access
to critical military and infrastructure systems in order to exploit them in the event
of hot conflict. Here we unpack those objectives in greater detail and explore how
cyber and information operations might be used to support them in the region.
In order to support friendly regimes, the Russians could penetrate the networks
of two groups of states: the friendly states and those states who might endanger
them. They would monitor networks in friendly states to ensure that they
maintain situational awareness of the military situation and to identify potential
military problems (i.e. coup plans) within friendly countries, particularly
Venezuela and to a lesser extent Cuba.
The potential adversaries to friends in the region really only include the
Colombians and the United States. In particular, the Russian armed forces are
most likely seek to enter Colombian and U.S. intelligence and command and
control (C2) networks to both build better awareness of military plans and to
conduct operational preparation of the environment so that they could slow
down or take out C2 networks in case of conflict. In addition, the Russians have
perhaps the most advanced capability in the world to disrupt delivery of critical
infrastructure services, like power delivery. In order to conduct such operations,
they work to create and maintain access to critical infrastructure systems in
adversarial or potentially adversarial countries. They already engage in similar
activities in the United States and may do the same in other adversarial countries
in the Americas.
Economic Objectives
Identifying Russia’s economic objectives can be difficult. Its legitimate trade with
Latin America and the Caribbean is miniscule in comparison to both China and
the United States. In addition, Russian exports to Latin America and the
Caribbean make up a small fraction of their total export. Globally, Russia’s
exports are primarily in the arms, energy, and metals sectors. However, 39
percent of Russia’s domestic economy is underground—in the so-called shadow
economy.127 Here we will unpack Russian objectives in the arms, energy and raw
materials, and underground markets and then explore how cyber or information
operations might be used to support those objectives in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
Annual Russian arms sales to Latin America and the Caribbean make up a
relatively small percentage of their overall arms sales, with the LAC market
hovering between 0 and 15 percent of annual arms exports. Nicaragua, Mexico,
Venezuela, and Cuba are the primary arms customers in the region. Between
1992 and 2017, Venezuela accounted for 73 percent of the local market for arms.
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128

Apart from arms, the brunt of the Russian economy lies in raw materials in the
form of crude and refined oil, as well as heavy metals, and the extraction and
treatment of these materials. Russia has already made deals with the likes of
Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Mexico, and Argentina to provide or support energy
129
production and could work to expand this effort.
In addition to these legitimate economic activities, one estimate posits that 39
130
percent of Russia’s domestic economy exists separately and underground.
Russian criminal activity is transnational, and some participants in Russian
131
criminal activity are closely involved with decision-makers in the Kremlin.
Russian actors will continue to seek access to black markets around the world
online and offline. Russians are crucial, for example, in the emerging
132
underground economy for offensive cyber capability. Russian business and
criminal groups will also likely continue to use bank accounts in Latin America
and the Caribbean to launder money in an effort to hide illicit activity.
In support of these economic interests, Russia could engage in a broad spectrum
of cyber and information activity. On the far end of the spectrum, Russia could
sabotage existing energy delivery systems via relatively cheap cyber means,
opening up new markets to Russian energy procurement and delivery support
and expertise. In addition, in order to create offensive cyber capability,
developers need to discover vulnerabilities in software and hardware and—
depending on the nature of the capability—develop working understanding of
how the specific targeted system works. While this lends to the difficulty in
scaling the sale of robust, targeted cyber capability, it means that, in order to
continue to operate in this market, Russian actors will necessarily need to probe
potential target systems. Cyber activities—likely by state and non-state actors—
will likely continue to complement the development of offensive cyber capability
for sale in black markets.
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Conclusion
Russia and China are conducting cyber operations throughout the Western
Hemisphere in support of their global policies and operations. While Russia seeks
to destabilize the global system for its own advantage, China’s goal is to maintain
the current system and replace the United States as the global hegemon.
Although their daily cyber operations will not pose a clear and present danger to
U.S. goals and activities in the region, the cumulative effect of their cyber
operations will endanger U.S. influence in the region, could circumscribe the U.S.
ability to operate in the region and, in the worst case, cause the United States to
allocate resources to the area in case of a global conflagration. To ensure that
China and Russia do not achieve their objectives, the United States must operate
in the region as well as build partner cyber capacity throughout the area.
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